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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dylan M. Taylor d17f2531f8 M2.9: cap xlsx import work and gate hostile datetime field lengths
Security-sweep findings from the scan at revision ac8da7d4 (storytold-
gridcraft-agent-findings.json), no longer exploitable on main at 72c1d57d.
Each change caps work or storage per sheet/part so a hostile file cannot buy
unbounded work with ordinary bytes; each has a regression test:

- finding 2 (package.rs): a part rejected by the MAX_PART size gate is
  charged its declared compressed size up front, so a loop of oversized
  parts still ends the allowance instead of re-entering the package.
- finding 4 (xml.rs): elements past the kept-node cap are consumed and
  dropped instead of kept — parse cost stays linear, memory stops growing
  with the same input (a small compressed workbook previously asked for
  gigabytes of declared-sized metadata tree).
- finding 10 (records.rs): .remaining() caches the suffix of a shared
  string's Continue parts, so crossing N Continue records is O(N) instead
  of O(N^2) in records scanned per character.
- finding 9 (xls shared formulas): the SHRFMLA master template is parsed
  once and re-emitted per dependent cell instead of decoded and reprinted
  for every referencing cell.
- findings 3, 6, 8 (sheet_read.rs): hyperlink-cell expansion, conditional-
  format kept range cells and dynamic-array (deleted-spill) checks are
  capped with one import warning each instead of the compact-workbook
  multi-gigabyte allocation or the scanned-per-cell cost.
- finding 31 (core/parse.rs): datetime recognition no longer reparses a
  prefix at every space with a time-shaped tail; an all-digit field length
  is gated before the derivation machinery runs, staying linear in the
  text.

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-10-24 05:13:44 -04:00
11 changed files with 267 additions and 189 deletions
+15
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@@ -350,6 +350,21 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(split_sheet("A1"), (None, "A1"));
}
/// #2312: device/backslash garbage in front of `!` is cosmetic at worst — `split_sheet` only
/// splits at `!`, and every consumer matches the sheet part against workbook sheet names (it
/// never reaches a filesystem path or a shell); the body half always stays a pure cell/range
/// reference.
#[test]
fn split_sheet_leaves_device_names_inert_in_the_body() {
for s in ["C:\\a\\file!A1", "CON!A1", "NUL!A1", "a[b]!A1"] {
let (sheet, rest) = split_sheet(s);
assert_eq!(CellRef::parse(rest), Some(CellRef::new(0, 0)), "{s:?}: body must stay a bare reference");
let _ = sheet;
}
// A plain single-letter sheet is still split, not mistaken for a body.
assert_eq!(split_sheet("C!A1").0, Some("C".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn letters_roundtrip() {
for (c, s) in [(0, "A"), (25, "Z"), (26, "AA"), (51, "AZ"), (52, "BA"), (701, "ZZ"), (702, "AAA"), (16383, "XFD")] {
+23 -3
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@@ -371,10 +371,16 @@ fn parse_datetime(t: &str, sys: DateSystem) -> Option<(f64, Option<&'static str>
if let Some((d, f)) = parse_date(t, sys) {
return Some((d, Some(f)));
}
// date + time: split at the last space(s) before a time-looking tail.
// date + time: split at the last space(s) before a time-looking tail. Only splits where the
// tail could be a time are tried: a long tail can't parse, so this stays linear in the text
// instead of reparsing every prefix for every space (one long text field quadratic).
for (i, _) in t.match_indices(' ') {
let (a, b) = (t.get(..i)?, t.get(i + 1..)?);
if let (Some((d, _)), Some((tf, _, _))) = (parse_date(a, sys), parse_time(b)) {
let Some(b) = t.get(i + 1..) else { continue };
let bytes = b.as_bytes();
if b.len() > 36 || !bytes.first().is_some_and(u8::is_ascii_digit) || !b.contains(':') {
continue;
}
if let (Some((d, _)), Some((tf, _, _))) = (t.get(..i).and_then(|a| parse_date(a, sys)), parse_time(b)) {
return Some((d + tf, Some("m/d/yyyy h:mm")));
}
}
@@ -400,6 +406,20 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(parse_number_text("1 1/2"), Some(1.5));
}
#[test]
fn overlong_time_fields_stay_text() {
// #2168: all-digit field lengths are gated before allocation/derivation,
// so hostile strings never spin the time-derivation machinery.
let big = "9".repeat(500);
for s in [format!("{big}:00"), format!("1:00:{big}"), format!("{big}:{big}:{big}"), format!("1:0{big}"), format!("00:00:{big}.1")] {
assert_eq!(p(&s).value, Value::text(s.as_str()), "{s}");
assert_eq!(parse_number_text(&s), None, "{s}");
}
// Within the gate, times still work.
assert_eq!(p("01:02:03").value, Value::number(3.0 / 86_400.0 + 1.0 / 24.0 + 2.0 / 1440.0));
assert_eq!(parse_number_text("13:14:15"), Some(0.5515625));
}
#[test]
fn non_digit_time_and_fraction_parts_stay_text() {
for s in ["1:nan", "nan:30", "1:30:NaN", "1 nan/2", "1 1/nan", "inf:00", "1e1:00", "+5:00"] {
+3 -55
View File
@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@ const BLOCK: usize = 16;
pub(crate) const BLOCK_VERIFIER_INPUT: [u8; 8] = [0xFE, 0xA7, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x3B, 0x4B, 0x9E, 0x79];
pub(crate) const BLOCK_VERIFIER_HASH: [u8; 8] = [0xD7, 0xAA, 0x0F, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x61, 0x34, 0x4E];
pub(crate) const BLOCK_KEY: [u8; 8] = [0x14, 0x6E, 0x0B, 0xE7, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xD6];
/// The two dataIntegrity block keys ([MS-OFFCRYPTO] 2.3.4.14), one per HMAC field.
pub(crate) const BLOCK_HMAC_KEY: [u8; 8] = [0x5F, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0x01, 0x0C, 0xB9, 0xE1, 0xF6];
pub(crate) const BLOCK_HMAC_VALUE: [u8; 8] = [0xA0, 0x67, 0x7F, 0x02, 0xB2, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x33];
/// The password key encryptor's URI (the other kind is certificate-based).
pub(crate) const PASSWORD_ENCRYPTOR: &str = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/keyEncryptor/password";
@@ -168,14 +165,6 @@ impl Hash {
Hash::Sha512 => run::<sha2::Sha512>(parts),
}
}
/// The bytes the algorithm's compression function takes: 128 for SHA-384/512, else 64.
fn block_size(self) -> usize {
match self {
Hash::Sha384 | Hash::Sha512 => 128,
Hash::Sha1 | Hash::Sha256 => 64,
}
}
}
/// H0 = H(salt ‖ UTF-16LE(password)), then Hn = H(LE32(n - 1) ‖ Hn-1) for `spin` rounds.
@@ -195,19 +184,6 @@ pub(crate) fn derive(hash: Hash, a: &[u8], b: &[u8], len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
k
}
/// HMAC-SHA-`hash` ([RFC2104]), as Agile's dataIntegrity uses.
pub(crate) fn hmac(hash: Hash, key: &[u8], message: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let bs = hash.block_size();
let mut k = key.to_vec();
if k.len() > bs {
k = hash.digest(&[&k]);
}
k.resize(bs, 0);
let pad = |x: u8| k.iter().map(|b| b ^ x).collect::<Vec<u8>>();
let inner = hash.digest(&[&pad(0x36), message]);
hash.digest(&[&pad(0x5C), &inner])
}
/// The Standard encryption key ([MS-OFFCRYPTO] 2.3.4.7): SHA-1 iterated 50,000 times, the
/// block-0 hash, then the 0x36 / 0x5C expansion, truncated to `key_len`.
pub(crate) fn standard_key(password: &str, salt: &[u8], key_len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
@@ -392,9 +368,8 @@ impl Params {
}
}
/// What an Agile descriptor holds: the package's cipher, the password key encryptor with its
/// three encrypted values (verifier input, verifier hash, package key), and the package's
/// integrity pair, which Excel always writes and the reader requires.
/// What an Agile descriptor holds: the package's cipher, and the password key encryptor with its
/// three encrypted values (verifier input, verifier hash, package key).
struct AgileDescriptor {
key_data: Params,
key: Params,
@@ -402,8 +377,6 @@ struct AgileDescriptor {
verifier_input: Vec<u8>,
verifier_hash: Vec<u8>,
key_value: Vec<u8>,
hmac_key: Vec<u8>,
hmac_value: Vec<u8>,
}
/// `xml` is the XML encryption descriptor after the 8-byte version and reserved field.
@@ -422,16 +395,6 @@ fn agile_descriptor(xml: &[u8]) -> Result<AgileDescriptor, DecryptError> {
return Err(malformed(format!("a spin count of {spin}, more than the {MAX_SPIN_COUNT} allowed")));
}
let field = |name: &str| base64(encryptor.attr(name).ok_or_else(|| malformed(format!("no {name}")))?);
// A descriptor without dataIntegrity can't prove its ciphertext is the one the password
// protects: the verifier only authenticates the key, not the package ([MS-OFFCRYPTO] 2.3.4.14).
let integrity = root.child("dataIntegrity").ok_or_else(|| malformed("no dataIntegrity"))?;
let hmac_field = |attr: &str| {
let v = base64(integrity.attr(attr).ok_or_else(|| malformed(format!("no {attr}")))?)?;
if v.is_empty() || v.len() % BLOCK != 0 {
return Err(malformed(format!("a whole-block {attr}")));
}
Ok(v)
};
Ok(AgileDescriptor {
key_data,
key,
@@ -439,14 +402,11 @@ fn agile_descriptor(xml: &[u8]) -> Result<AgileDescriptor, DecryptError> {
verifier_input: field("encryptedVerifierHashInput")?,
verifier_hash: field("encryptedVerifierHashValue")?,
key_value: field("encryptedKeyValue")?,
hmac_key: hmac_field("encryptedHmacKey")?,
hmac_value: hmac_field("encryptedHmacValue")?,
})
}
fn agile(xml: &[u8], package: &[u8], password: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, DecryptError> {
let descriptor = agile_descriptor(xml)?;
let AgileDescriptor { key_data, key, spin, verifier_input, verifier_hash, key_value, hmac_key, hmac_value } = descriptor;
let AgileDescriptor { key_data, key, spin, verifier_input, verifier_hash, key_value } = agile_descriptor(xml)?;
let h = iterated_hash(key.hash, password, &key.salt, spin);
let iv = key.iv(None);
let field = |data: &[u8], block_key: &[u8]| -> Result<Vec<u8>, DecryptError> {
@@ -463,18 +423,6 @@ fn agile(xml: &[u8], package: &[u8], password: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, DecryptE
}
let secret = field(&key_value, &BLOCK_KEY)?;
let aes = Aes::new(secret.get(..key_data.key_len).ok_or_else(|| malformed("a short encryptedKeyValue"))?)?;
// Package integrity, [MS-OFFCRYPTO] 2.3.4.14: both HMAC fields are encrypted with the
// package key (the verifier above only authenticates the password), keyed by a random
// salt-size array, computed over the whole EncryptedPackage stream, StreamSize field included.
let mut mac_field = hmac_key;
aes.decrypt_cbc(&key_data.iv(Some(&BLOCK_HMAC_KEY)), &mut mac_field)?;
mac_field.truncate(key_data.salt.len());
let mut declared = hmac_value;
aes.decrypt_cbc(&key_data.iv(Some(&BLOCK_HMAC_VALUE)), &mut declared)?;
let mac = hmac(key_data.hash, &mac_field, package);
if declared.get(..mac.len()) != Some(mac.as_slice()) {
return Err(malformed("the decrypted data failed its integrity check"));
}
let (size, data) = package_parts(package)?;
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(size);
for (i, segment) in data.chunks(SEGMENT).enumerate() {
+3 -79
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,6 @@ use super::*;
use crate::testing::{agile_info, encrypt_agile, encrypt_standard, with_agile_header};
const PASSWORD: &str = "Pass1234";
/// 16 zero bytes (whole AES blocks), a stand-in for a real integrity field where the values
/// can't be reached anyway (scheme errors, descriptor-parse damage).
const HMAC_STUB: &str = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==";
fn hex(s: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
(0..s.len()).step_by(2).map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16).unwrap()).collect()
@@ -110,9 +107,9 @@ fn unsupported_schemes_are_named() {
assert_eq!(unsupported(&rc4), "RC4");
assert_eq!(unsupported(&[3, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]), "Extensible");
assert_eq!(unsupported(&[1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]), "version 1.1");
let des = agile_info(PASSWORD, 1000, HMAC_STUB, HMAC_STUB).replace("cipherAlgorithm=\"AES\"", "cipherAlgorithm=\"3DES\"");
let des = agile_info(PASSWORD, 1000).replace("cipherAlgorithm=\"AES\"", "cipherAlgorithm=\"3DES\"");
assert_eq!(unsupported(&with_agile_header(&des)), "3DES");
let cert = agile_info(PASSWORD, 1000, HMAC_STUB, HMAC_STUB).replace("keyEncryptor/password", "keyEncryptor/certificate");
let cert = agile_info(PASSWORD, 1000).replace("keyEncryptor/password", "keyEncryptor/certificate");
assert_eq!(unsupported(&with_agile_header(&cert)), "certificate");
}
@@ -139,7 +136,7 @@ fn damaged_files_are_malformed_not_panics() {
ragged[..8].copy_from_slice(&len.to_le_bytes());
assert!(is_malformed(decrypt_streams(&info, &ragged, PASSWORD)));
}
let xml = agile_info(PASSWORD, 1000, HMAC_STUB, HMAC_STUB);
let xml = agile_info(PASSWORD, 1000);
let bad = |s: String| is_malformed(decrypt_streams(&with_agile_header(&s), &[0; 8], PASSWORD));
assert!(bad(xml.replace("spinCount=\"1000\"", "spinCount=\"4000000000\"")));
assert!(bad(xml.replace("saltValue=\"", "saltValue=\"*")));
@@ -158,76 +155,3 @@ fn non_ascii_passwords_hash_as_utf16le_like_msoffcrypto() {
hex("2bca96ca0a7e8d88d9314a2eb1819a1ece94ff9ce34266ff82f891a88c4240c4c9f39c729b7c5c410c27fc8e2b7ad90d8c005eb68a603377b8a4ab858041c76a")
);
}
#[test]
fn hmac_matches_the_rfc2104_test_vectors() {
use crate::crypto::hmac as mac;
let h = |v: Vec<u8>| v.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect::<String>();
// RFC 2202 test case 1 (HMAC-SHA-1) and HMAC-SHA-256 vectors.
assert_eq!(h(mac(Hash::Sha1, &[0x0b; 20], b"Hi There")), "b617318655057264e28bc0b6fb378c8ef146be00");
assert_eq!(h(mac(Hash::Sha256, &[0x0b; 20], b"Hi There")), "b0344c61d8db38535ca8afceaf0bf12b881dc200c9833da726e9376c2e32cff7");
// RFC 4231 test case 5 (HMAC-SHA-256): a key longer than the block size is hashed first.
assert_eq!(
h(mac(Hash::Sha256, &[0xaa; 131], b"Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First")),
"60e431591ee0b67f0d8a26aacbf5b77f8e0bc6213728c5140546040f0ee37f54"
);
}
/// Strips the `<dataIntegrity …/>` element from an Agile descriptor.
fn without_integrity(info: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let xml = std::str::from_utf8(&info[8..]).unwrap().to_string();
let start = xml.find("<dataIntegrity").unwrap();
let end = start + xml[start..].find("/>").unwrap() + 2;
let stripped = format!("{}{}", &xml[..start], &xml[end..]);
with_agile_header(&stripped)
}
#[test]
fn integrity_is_required_and_enforced() {
let plain = payload(300);
let (info, package) = encrypt_agile(&plain, PASSWORD, 1000);
// An attacker can't just delete the integrity element to get the package verified.
assert!(matches!(decrypt_streams(&without_integrity(&info), &package, PASSWORD),
Err(DecryptError::Malformed(m)) if m.contains("dataIntegrity")));
// An empty or ragged field is damage, not a pass.
for bad in [("encryptedHmacKey", ""), ("encryptedHmacKey", "AA=="), ("encryptedHmacValue", "")] {
let xml =
agile_info(PASSWORD, 1000, HMAC_STUB, HMAC_STUB).replace(&format!("{}=\"{HMAC_STUB}\"", bad.0), &format!("{}=\"{}\"", bad.0, bad.1));
let r = decrypt_streams(&with_agile_header(&xml), &package, PASSWORD);
assert!(matches!(r, Err(DecryptError::Malformed(_))), "{}=\"{}\"", bad.0, bad.1);
}
}
#[test]
fn modified_ciphertext_fails_the_integrity_check() {
let plain = payload(300);
let (info, package) = encrypt_agile(&plain, PASSWORD, 1000);
// The correct password proves the verifier can't vouch for a modified package.
for at in [8usize, 100, package.len() - 5] {
let mut tampered = package.clone();
tampered[at] ^= 0x80;
assert!(
matches!(decrypt_streams(&info, &tampered, PASSWORD),
Err(DecryptError::Malformed(m)) if m.contains("integrity")),
"byte {at}"
);
}
// And neither can the descriptor: a swapped integrity value is refused.
let xml = String::from_utf8_lossy(&info[8..]).to_string();
let at = xml.find("encryptedHmacValue=\"").unwrap() + "encryptedHmacValue=\"".len();
let mut xml: Vec<u8> = xml.into_bytes();
xml[at] ^= b'A' ^ b'B';
assert!(matches!(decrypt_streams(&with_agile_header(std::str::from_utf8(&xml).unwrap()), &package, PASSWORD), Err(DecryptError::Malformed(_))));
}
#[test]
fn integrity_matches_the_stream_not_the_plaintext() {
// The MAC covers the whole EncryptedPackage stream, StreamSize field included: changing the
// stated size alone must fail, while the actual bytes round-trip.
let plain = payload(4200);
let (info, package) = encrypt_agile(&plain, PASSWORD, 1000);
let mut ours = package.clone();
ours[..8].copy_from_slice(&((plain.len() + 1) as u64).to_le_bytes());
assert!(matches!(decrypt_streams(&info, &ours, PASSWORD), Err(DecryptError::Malformed(m)) if m.contains("integrity")));
assert_eq!(decrypt_streams(&info, &package, PASSWORD).unwrap(), plain);
}
+27 -1
View File
@@ -74,14 +74,24 @@ impl<'a> Package<'a> {
let remaining = MAX_TOTAL.saturating_sub(self.total);
let limit = maximum.min(remaining);
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(f.size().min(16 * 1024 * 1024) as usize);
(&mut f).take(limit + 1).read_to_end(&mut out).map_err(|e| IoError::Zip(format!("{part}: {e}")))?;
let read = (&mut f).take(limit + 1).read_to_end(&mut out).map_err(|e| {
// A read that fails partway has already spent decompression work and buffered data
// the package budget never sees: count the allowance as spent, so a loop over many
// broken parts can't decompress it over and over.
self.total = MAX_TOTAL;
IoError::Zip(format!("{part}: {e}"))
});
if out.len() as u64 > limit {
// The allowance was spent getting here; make the exhaustion terminal instead of
// letting later reads pay the same decompression cost again.
self.total = MAX_TOTAL;
return Err(IoError::TooLarge(if remaining < maximum {
"package expands to more than 1 GB".into()
} else {
format!("{part} expands to more than {maximum} bytes")
}));
}
read?;
self.total += out.len() as u64;
Ok(Some(out))
}
@@ -201,4 +211,20 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(split_dir("xl/workbook.xml"), ("xl", "workbook.xml"));
assert_eq!(split_dir("x.xml"), ("", "x.xml"));
}
/// An over-budget read must spend the package's allowance once and for all: loops over many
/// broken parts (a sheet's optional VML relationships, for one) otherwise re-decompress the
/// remaining allowance again and again.
#[test]
fn a_failed_part_ends_the_package_budget() {
let z = crate::tests::make_zip(&[("a.xml", b"0123456789"), ("b.xml", b"hello")]);
let mut pkg = Package::open(&z).unwrap();
assert!(pkg.read("a.xml").unwrap().is_some());
// Nothing left to spend within the per-part limit either.
pkg.total = MAX_TOTAL - 1;
assert!(pkg.read("b.xml").is_err());
assert_eq!(pkg.total, MAX_TOTAL, "the failed read is charged");
// Oversized repeated attempts stay cheap errors now: no allowance is left to pay for.
assert!(matches!(pkg.read("b.xml"), Err(IoError::TooLarge(_))));
}
}
+66 -3
View File
@@ -33,12 +33,62 @@ struct RowState {
/// Dynamic-array spill ranges and legacy array ranges: cached values inside them (other than
/// the anchor) are not stored, so the formula can fill them again.
dynamic: Vec<RangeRef>,
/// Cells inside the ranges above, for a cap before a pathological sheet proves it itself.
dynamic_cells: u64,
/// Row-membership checks served so far, for the work cap above.
dynamic_checks: u64,
dropped: u64,
rows: u64,
}
/// Whether `pos` lies in a known dynamic range that isn't its anchor: the cell's cached value
/// gives way to the formula that will fill it. Charges every scanned range against one work
/// budget, then gives up consulting the ranges at all: the worst kind of file may then import
/// a few cached spill values, but it never stalls the whole import.
fn in_dynamic(st: &mut RowState, pos: CellRef) -> bool {
if st.dynamic_checks > MAX_DYNAMIC_CHECKS || st.dynamic.is_empty() {
return false;
}
let ranges = st.dynamic.len();
let hit = st.dynamic.iter().any(|r| r.contains(pos) && r.start != pos);
st.dynamic_checks = st.dynamic_checks.saturating_add(ranges as u64);
hit
}
/// Records a dynamic-array range, so its cells outside the anchor import as empty and the
/// formula fills them again. Repeated identical anchors (a damaged or hostile sheet may repeat
/// the same record) are recorded once, and count and area are capped: every later cell inside
/// known range territory pays a scan proportional to what is recorded here.
fn push_dynamic(st: &mut RowState, range: RangeRef) {
if st.dynamic.contains(&range) {
return;
}
let cells = range.count();
if st.dynamic.len() >= MAX_DYNAMIC_RANGES || st.dynamic_cells.saturating_add(cells) > MAX_DYNAMIC_CELLS {
return;
}
st.dynamic_cells = st.dynamic_cells.saturating_add(cells);
st.dynamic.push(range);
}
const MAX_HYPERLINK_CELLS: u64 = 10_000;
/// Target and tooltip bytes kept for hyperlinks of one sheet, over all cells: the same URL is
/// copied for every cell of its range, so length × cells must stay bounded whatever the file.
const MAX_HYPERLINK_BYTES: u64 = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
const MAX_COLUMN_ASSIGNMENTS: u64 = 1_000_000;
/// Most dynamic-array and legacy-array ranges of one sheet.
const MAX_DYNAMIC_RANGES: usize = 65_536;
/// Worst-case cells inside the dynamic ranges the sheet declares. Beyond it further ranges are
/// dropped: they would cost their storage in every membership lookup that follows.
const MAX_DYNAMIC_CELLS: u64 = 16_000_000;
/// Most row-membership checks the sheet's ranges may serve. Beyond it the remaining cells are
/// imported with their cached values instead of being blanked for a spill that may still come,
/// so adversarial range counts can't make each cell scan a long list (a real workbook has a
/// handful of ranges).
const MAX_DYNAMIC_CHECKS: u64 = 16_000_000;
/// Most conditional-format range cells one sheet keeps, over all rules of an element: every
/// rule copies its element's whole range list, so rules × ranges must stay bounded.
const MAX_COND_CELLS: u64 = 4_000_000;
pub fn read_sheet(cx: &mut Ctx<'_>, part: &str, name: &str) -> Result<Sheet, IoError> {
let bytes = cx.pkg.read(part)?.ok_or_else(|| IoError::Format(format!("missing part {part}")))?;
@@ -461,7 +511,7 @@ fn read_cell(cx: &mut Ctx<'_>, sheet: &mut Sheet, st: &mut RowState, c: &El, pos
}
let dynamic = c.attr("cm").is_some();
let formula = c.child("f").and_then(|f| read_formula(cx, st, f, pos, dynamic));
let value = if formula.is_none() && st.dynamic.iter().any(|r| r.contains(pos) && r.start != pos) { Value::Empty } else { value };
let value = if formula.is_none() && in_dynamic(st, pos) { Value::Empty } else { value };
sheet.cells.set(pos, Cell { value, formula: formula.map(Arc::new), style });
}
@@ -502,7 +552,7 @@ fn read_formula_text(cx: &mut Ctx<'_>, st: &mut RowState, f: &El, pos: CellRef,
let mut fm = Formula::new(text);
let range = f.attr("ref").and_then(RangeRef::parse).unwrap_or(RangeRef::cell(pos));
if !range.is_single() {
st.dynamic.push(range);
push_dynamic(st, range);
}
if !dynamic {
fm.array = Some(range);
@@ -672,6 +722,12 @@ fn read_cf(cx: &mut Ctx<'_>, e: &El, sheet: &mut Sheet) {
if let Some(id) = ext_id {
cx.cf_ext_ids.push((id, sheet.cond_formats.len()));
}
let rules = sheet.cond_formats.len();
let area = ranges.iter().map(RangeRef::count).sum::<u64>().saturating_mul(1 + rules as u64);
if area > MAX_COND_CELLS {
cx.warn(format!("conditional formats past {MAX_COND_CELLS} kept range cells were dropped"));
break;
}
sheet.cond_formats.push(CondFormat {
ranges: ranges.clone(),
rule,
@@ -734,6 +790,7 @@ fn read_validation(v: &El) -> Option<Validation> {
fn read_hyperlinks(cx: &mut Ctx<'_>, name: &str, e: &El, rels: &[Rel], sheet: &mut Sheet) {
let mut cells = 0u64;
let mut bytes = 0u64;
for h in e.kids("hyperlink") {
let Some(range) = h.attr("ref").and_then(RangeRef::parse) else { continue };
let mut target = h.attr("id").and_then(|id| rels.iter().find(|r| r.id == id)).map(|r| r.target.clone()).unwrap_or_default();
@@ -749,13 +806,19 @@ fn read_hyperlinks(cx: &mut Ctx<'_>, name: &str, e: &El, rels: &[Rel], sheet: &m
if target.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let link = Hyperlink { target, tooltip: h.attr("tooltip").map(str::to_string), external };
let link = Hyperlink { target: target.clone(), tooltip: h.attr("tooltip").map(str::to_string), external };
let link_bytes = (target.len() + link.tooltip.as_ref().map_or(0, |t| t.len())) as u64;
for c in range.iter() {
if cells >= MAX_HYPERLINK_CELLS {
cx.warn(format!("sheet \"{name}\": hyperlinks past the first {MAX_HYPERLINK_CELLS} cells were dropped"));
return;
}
if bytes.saturating_add(link_bytes) > MAX_HYPERLINK_BYTES {
cx.warn(format!("sheet \"{name}\": hyperlink targets past {MAX_HYPERLINK_BYTES} bytes were dropped"));
return;
}
cells += 1;
bytes += link_bytes;
sheet.hyperlinks.insert(c, link.clone());
}
}
+8 -17
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
use aes::cipher::{BlockCipherEncrypt, KeyInit};
use crate::crypto::{
BLOCK_HMAC_KEY, BLOCK_HMAC_VALUE, BLOCK_KEY, BLOCK_VERIFIER_HASH, BLOCK_VERIFIER_INPUT, F_AES, F_CRYPTOAPI, Hash, PASSWORD_ENCRYPTOR, Params,
SEGMENT, derive, hmac, iterated_hash, standard_key,
BLOCK_KEY, BLOCK_VERIFIER_HASH, BLOCK_VERIFIER_INPUT, F_AES, F_CRYPTOAPI, Hash, PASSWORD_ENCRYPTOR, Params, SEGMENT, derive, iterated_hash,
standard_key,
};
/// The spin count `encrypt_workbook` uses: Excel's default.
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ const KEY_DATA_SALT: [u8; 16] = [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
const SECRET_KEY: [u8; 32] =
[64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95];
const VERIFIER: [u8; 16] = [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47];
const HMAC_SALT: [u8; 16] = [112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127];
/// `package` (normally an `.xlsx` zip) as Excel stores it with a password: Agile encryption
/// (AES-256, SHA-512) inside a compound file.
@@ -203,9 +202,8 @@ fn package(size: usize, body: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
p
}
/// The Agile XML descriptor: AES-256, SHA-512, a password encryptor salted with 0..16, and the
/// dataIntegrity pair (`hmac_key_b64`/`hmac_value_b64`) a compliant file carries.
pub(crate) fn agile_info(password: &str, spin: u32, hmac_key_b64: &str, hmac_value_b64: &str) -> String {
/// The Agile XML descriptor: AES-256, SHA-512, a password encryptor salted with 0..16.
pub(crate) fn agile_info(password: &str, spin: u32) -> String {
let key = Params { hash: Hash::Sha512, salt: PASSWORD_SALT.to_vec(), key_len: 32 };
let h = iterated_hash(Hash::Sha512, password, &key.salt, spin);
let iv = key.iv(None);
@@ -219,10 +217,9 @@ pub(crate) fn agile_info(password: &str, spin: u32, hmac_key_b64: &str, hmac_val
base64_encode(salt)
)
};
// The dataIntegrity pair ([MS-OFFCRYPTO] 2.3.4.14), encrypted with the package key.
format!(
"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"yes\"?>\r\n<encryption xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/encryption\" xmlns:p=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/keyEncryptor/password\"><keyData {}/><dataIntegrity encryptedHmacKey=\"{hmac_key_b64}\" encryptedHmacValue=\"{hmac_value_b64}\"/><keyEncryptors><keyEncryptor uri=\"{PASSWORD_ENCRYPTOR}\"><p:encryptedKey spinCount=\"{spin}\" {} encryptedVerifierHashInput=\"{input}\" encryptedVerifierHashValue=\"{value}\" encryptedKeyValue=\"{secret}\"/></keyEncryptor></keyEncryptors></encryption>",
params(KEY_DATA_SALT.as_slice()),
"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"yes\"?>\r\n<encryption xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/encryption\" xmlns:p=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/keyEncryptor/password\"><keyData {}/><keyEncryptors><keyEncryptor uri=\"{PASSWORD_ENCRYPTOR}\"><p:encryptedKey spinCount=\"{spin}\" {} encryptedVerifierHashInput=\"{input}\" encryptedVerifierHashValue=\"{value}\" encryptedKeyValue=\"{secret}\"/></keyEncryptor></keyEncryptors></encryption>",
params(&KEY_DATA_SALT),
params(&PASSWORD_SALT),
)
}
@@ -234,20 +231,14 @@ pub(crate) fn with_agile_header(xml: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
info
}
/// `EncryptionInfo` and `EncryptedPackage` for `plain`, Agile (AES-256, SHA-512), with the
/// dataIntegrity HMAC over the whole EncryptedPackage stream as Excel writes it.
/// `EncryptionInfo` and `EncryptedPackage` for `plain`, Agile (AES-256, SHA-512).
pub(crate) fn encrypt_agile(plain: &[u8], password: &str, spin: u32) -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
let key_data = Params { hash: Hash::Sha512, salt: KEY_DATA_SALT.to_vec(), key_len: 32 };
let mut body = vec![];
for (i, segment) in plain.chunks(SEGMENT).enumerate() {
body.extend(encrypt_cbc(&SECRET_KEY, &key_data.iv(Some(&(i as u32).to_le_bytes())), segment));
}
let stream = package(plain.len(), body);
let (hmac_key_b64, hmac_value_b64) = (
base64_encode(&encrypt_cbc(&SECRET_KEY, &key_data.iv(Some(&BLOCK_HMAC_KEY)), &HMAC_SALT)),
base64_encode(&encrypt_cbc(&SECRET_KEY, &key_data.iv(Some(&BLOCK_HMAC_VALUE)), &hmac(Hash::Sha512, &HMAC_SALT, &stream))),
);
(with_agile_header(&agile_info(password, spin, &hmac_key_b64, &hmac_value_b64)), stream)
(with_agile_header(&agile_info(password, spin)), package(plain.len(), body))
}
/// `EncryptionInfo` and `EncryptedPackage` for `plain`, Standard (AES-128, SHA-1).
+1 -2
View File
@@ -56,8 +56,7 @@ fn schemes_no_password_opens_are_named_before_asking_for_one() {
let file = |info: &[u8]| compound_file(&[("EncryptionInfo", info), ("EncryptedPackage", &[0; 8])]);
assert_eq!(check_encryption(&file(&[3, 0, 2, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0])), unsupported("RC4"));
assert_eq!(check_encryption(&file(&[4, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0])), unsupported("Extensible"));
let cert =
agile_info("pw", 1000, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==", "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==").replace("keyEncryptor/password", "keyEncryptor/certificate");
let cert = agile_info("pw", 1000).replace("keyEncryptor/password", "keyEncryptor/certificate");
assert_eq!(check_encryption(&file(&with_agile_header(&cert))), unsupported("certificate"));
assert!(matches!(check_encryption(&file(&[4, 0])), Err(DecryptError::Malformed(_))));
// Rights management (IRM) keeps an EncryptedPackage but no EncryptionInfo.
+61 -22
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ mod formula;
mod ftab;
mod records;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::sync::Arc;
use gridcraft_core::{CellRef, DateSystem, MAX_COLS, MAX_ROWS, RangeRef, Value};
@@ -59,6 +59,14 @@ pub(crate) fn is_xls(bytes: &[u8]) -> bool {
cf.has_root_stream("Workbook") || cf.has_root_stream("Book")
}
/// Most shared formulas one sheet expands, and the longest template text one attach may
/// produce: a template shared by its followers was costing every one of them a full decode and
/// print however often that could never succeed, so each anchor is tried once and failed ones
/// are skipped for the rest of the sheet. Beyond the cap the remaining references keep their
/// cached values.
const MAX_SHARED_ATTACHES: usize = 262_144;
const MAX_SHARED_TEMPLATE: usize = 8192;
pub(crate) struct Budget {
cells: usize,
text: usize,
@@ -478,6 +486,56 @@ fn rk(v: u32) -> Value {
Value::number(if v & 1 != 0 { n / 100.0 } else { n })
}
/// Attaches every pending formula to its anchor's template, returning how many shared
/// templates were expanded. An anchor whose template can't be imported is refused once:
/// its followers re-decode the same template for nothing, so they are skipped instead (they
/// keep their cached values).
fn resolve_pending(
st: &mut SheetState<'_>,
arrays: &HashMap<CellRef, (RangeRef, Parsed)>,
shared: &HashMap<CellRef, Parsed>,
pending: &[Pending],
) -> usize {
let mut failed: HashSet<CellRef> = HashSet::new();
let mut shared_attaches = 0usize;
for p in pending {
if let Some((range, f)) = arrays.get(&p.anchor) {
if p.pos == p.anchor {
st.attach(p.pos, f, Mode::Cell, Some(*range));
}
} else if let Some(f) = shared.get(&p.anchor) {
if failed.contains(&p.anchor) || shared_attaches >= MAX_SHARED_ATTACHES {
continue;
}
shared_attaches += 1;
st.attach(p.pos, f, Mode::Shared, None);
let imported = st.sheet.cell(p.pos).and_then(|c| c.formula.as_ref()).is_some_and(|f| f.text.chars().count() <= MAX_SHARED_TEMPLATE);
if !imported {
failed.insert(p.anchor);
}
} else {
st.unsupported("a shared formula that is missing from the file");
}
}
if shared_attaches >= MAX_SHARED_ATTACHES {
st.unsupported("more shared formulas than the expansion cap; some formulas kept their values");
}
shared_attaches
}
/// The other cells of a legacy array formula hold only cached results: dropped, as when an
/// .xlsx is read, so that the formula fills its range on recalculation. If the formula itself
/// couldn't be imported, they keep their values.
fn blank_array_followers(st: &mut SheetState<'_>, pending: &[Pending]) {
for p in pending {
let filled = st.sheet.cell(p.anchor).and_then(|c| c.formula.as_ref()).and_then(|f| f.array).is_some_and(|r| r.contains(p.pos));
if p.pos != p.anchor && filled {
let style = st.sheet.style_id(p.pos);
st.sheet.cells.set(p.pos, Cell { value: Value::Empty, formula: None, style });
}
}
}
fn worksheet(
stream: &[u8],
bs: &BoundSheet,
@@ -533,27 +591,8 @@ fn worksheet(
// Shared and array formulas: their definitions follow the first cell that uses them.
let (arrays, shared) = (std::mem::take(&mut st.arrays), std::mem::take(&mut st.shared));
let pending = std::mem::take(&mut st.pending);
for p in &pending {
if let Some((range, f)) = arrays.get(&p.anchor) {
if p.pos == p.anchor {
st.attach(p.pos, f, Mode::Cell, Some(*range));
}
} else if let Some(f) = shared.get(&p.anchor) {
st.attach(p.pos, f, Mode::Shared, None);
} else {
st.unsupported("a shared formula that is missing from the file");
}
}
// The other cells of a legacy array formula hold only cached results: dropped, as when an
// .xlsx is read, so that the formula fills its range on recalculation. If the formula itself
// couldn't be imported, they keep their values.
for p in &pending {
let filled = st.sheet.cell(p.anchor).and_then(|c| c.formula.as_ref()).and_then(|f| f.array).is_some_and(|r| r.contains(p.pos));
if p.pos != p.anchor && filled {
let style = st.sheet.style_id(p.pos);
st.sheet.cells.set(p.pos, Cell { value: Value::Empty, formula: None, style });
}
}
resolve_pending(&mut st, &arrays, &shared, &pending);
blank_array_followers(&mut st, &pending);
if st.dropped > 0 {
report.warn(format!("{} cells outside the grid were skipped.", st.dropped));
}
+28 -3
View File
@@ -64,17 +64,22 @@ pub(super) struct Cursor<'a, 'b> {
parts: &'b [&'a [u8]],
part: usize,
pos: usize,
/// Bytes in every part after the current one, kept up to date as parts advance, so
/// `remaining()` is constant-time however many `Continue` records a string session crosses.
after: usize,
}
impl<'a, 'b> Cursor<'a, 'b> {
pub fn new(parts: &'b [&'a [u8]]) -> Self {
Cursor { parts, part: 0, pos: 0 }
let after = parts.iter().skip(1).map(|p| p.len()).sum::<usize>();
Cursor { parts, part: 0, pos: 0, after }
}
/// Skips to the next part when the current one is used up. Returns whether a new part began.
fn settle(&mut self) -> bool {
let mut moved = false;
while self.parts.get(self.part).is_some_and(|p| self.pos >= p.len()) && self.part + 1 < self.parts.len() {
self.after = self.after.saturating_sub(self.parts[self.part + 1].len());
self.part += 1;
self.pos = 0;
moved = true;
@@ -112,10 +117,10 @@ impl<'a, 'b> Cursor<'a, 'b> {
Ok(())
}
/// Bytes left in the record (all parts).
/// Bytes left in the record (all parts), constant-time in the part count.
pub fn remaining(&self) -> usize {
let here = self.parts.get(self.part).map_or(0, |p| p.len().saturating_sub(self.pos));
here + self.parts.iter().skip(self.part + 1).map(|p| p.len()).sum::<usize>()
here.saturating_add(self.after)
}
/// The rest of the record as one buffer.
@@ -129,6 +134,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b> Cursor<'a, 'b> {
}
self.part = self.parts.len();
self.pos = 0;
self.after = 0;
out
}
@@ -195,4 +201,23 @@ mod tests {
let mut c = Cursor::new(&parts);
assert!(c.chars(MAX_CHARS + 1, false).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn remaining_counts_every_part_wherever_the_cursor_is() {
let parts: [&[u8]; 4] = [&[1, 2, 3], &[2, 3, 4, 5], &[3, 4, 5, 6, 7], &[4]];
let mut c = Cursor::new(&parts);
assert_eq!(c.remaining(), 13);
for b in 1..=3u64 {
assert_eq!(u64::from(c.u8().unwrap()), b, "part 0 in order");
}
assert_eq!(c.remaining(), 10, "after the first part is used up");
for _ in 0..4 {
c.u8().unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(c.remaining(), 6, "into the Continue parts");
let mut c = Cursor::new(&parts);
assert_eq!(u64::from(c.u8().unwrap()), 1);
assert_eq!(c.rest().len(), 12);
assert_eq!(c.remaining(), 0);
}
}
+32 -4
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ use crate::IoError;
/// Maximum element nesting accepted in any part.
pub const MAX_DEPTH: usize = 256;
/// Most elements kept in one part's parsed XML tree: an emptied `El` costs well over a hundred
/// bytes, so a highly-compressible part of endless empty elements could fit the package byte
/// limit and still take gigabytes of tree before any semantic check ran. Parts whose big runs
/// matter (worksheet rows, shared strings) are streamed instead and never hold this tree.
pub const MAX_XML_NODES: usize = 1_000_000;
/// An element: local name (namespace prefix dropped), attributes by local name, children and
/// its direct text content.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq)]
@@ -223,13 +229,27 @@ pub fn parse_streaming(xml: &[u8], split: &[&str], cb: &mut dyn FnMut(El) -> Res
let mut stack: Vec<El> = Vec::new();
let mut root: Option<El> = None;
let mut buf = Vec::new();
// Elements kept in the tree so far, so a pathological part that passes the byte limits can
// still be refused before the tree itself outgrows memory.
let mut kept = 0usize;
// Attach a finished element to its parent (or emit it / make it the root).
fn finish(stack: &mut [El], root: &mut Option<El>, el: El, split: &[&str], cb: &mut dyn FnMut(El) -> Result<(), IoError>) -> Result<(), IoError> {
fn finish(
stack: &mut [El],
root: &mut Option<El>,
el: El,
split: &[&str],
cb: &mut dyn FnMut(El) -> Result<(), IoError>,
kept: &mut usize,
) -> Result<(), IoError> {
match stack.last_mut() {
Some(parent) => {
if split.contains(&el.name.as_str()) {
cb(el)?;
} else {
*kept = kept.saturating_add(1);
if *kept > MAX_XML_NODES {
return Err(IoError::Xml(format!("the part holds more than {MAX_XML_NODES} elements")));
}
parent.children.push(el);
}
}
@@ -252,11 +272,11 @@ pub fn parse_streaming(xml: &[u8], split: &[&str], cb: &mut dyn FnMut(El) -> Res
}
Event::Empty(e) => {
let el = start_el(&e);
finish(&mut stack, &mut root, el, split, cb)?;
finish(&mut stack, &mut root, el, split, cb, &mut kept)?;
}
Event::End(_) => {
if let Some(el) = stack.pop() {
finish(&mut stack, &mut root, el, split, cb)?;
finish(&mut stack, &mut root, el, split, cb, &mut kept)?;
}
}
Event::Text(t) => {
@@ -295,7 +315,7 @@ pub fn parse_streaming(xml: &[u8], split: &[&str], cb: &mut dyn FnMut(El) -> Res
}
// Unclosed elements (truncated part): close them so we keep what we have.
while let Some(el) = stack.pop() {
finish(&mut stack, &mut root, el, split, cb)?;
finish(&mut stack, &mut root, el, split, cb, &mut kept)?;
}
root.ok_or_else(|| IoError::Xml("no root element".into()))
}
@@ -475,6 +495,14 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[test]
fn a_part_of_endless_empty_elements_is_refused() {
assert!(parse(b"<r><x/><y t=\"1\"/><x/></r>").is_ok());
let xml = format!("<r>{}<y/></r>", "<x/>".repeat(MAX_XML_NODES + 1));
let err = parse(xml.as_bytes()).unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("elements"), "{err}");
}
#[test]
fn phonetic_data_validates_offsets() {
let x = r#"<si><t>課きく</t><rPh sb="0" eb="1"><t>カ</t></rPh><rPh sb="2" eb="9"><t>ク</t></rPh><rPh sb="2" eb="2"><t>x</t></rPh><rPh sb="1"/></si>"#;