From CodeRabbit's review of the stack: - Every JBIG2 image read its /JBIG2Globals afresh, within 32 MiB each but with no bound across an export or a redaction. A globals stream of the file, not edited since it was read and with its /DecodeParms direct, now has its filters undone once a document and is kept for the images that share it (in every clone, which share the file), up to 64 MiB in all. An edited one, one added in memory, or one with /DecodeParms by reference (another object, which can change under it) is read each time as before. This saves the filters only: the decoder reads the segments afresh for every image, so a real symbol dictionary still costs its decoding once an image. - view.copy-image dropped "JBIG2 inside other filters" from its missing list on the strength of Export's test; Copy Image now has its own: a JBIG2 picture behind ASCIIHexDecode is found under the pointer and copied as its pixels and as a PNG, and one whose page information is in its globals is read through them. A JBIG2 image's /Width and /Height are read as given directly; one by reference is an error rather than an image of no rows. A /JBIG2Globals reference to no object still reads as no globals: it is a reference to null (ISO 32000-2 §7.3.10), which an entry may hold for being absent (§7.3.7), and the renderer draws the page so. An image that needed those globals then mostly fails to decode; in a probe of twelve pictures that decoded with them, eleven were refused and one decoded to other pixels. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AmsdeUCdTaD72jkDw2pJKY
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pdfcraft-cos
The PDF object layer (ISO 32000-2 §7): the COS object graph, parsed lazily and tolerantly, edited through a copy-on-write overlay, and written back incrementally or as a full rewrite.
- Layer: L1, standalone. The layering table lets it use only
pdfcraft-filters,pdfcraft-cryptandpdfcraft-geom(xtask/src/layers.rs::STANDALONE_DEPS); it currently uses the first two. That keeps the parser and the crypto independently auditable and reusable. #![forbid(unsafe_code)], and the crate deniesunwrap/expect/panic!/todo!. Builds forwasm32-unknown-unknown.
The object graph is the document model. Nothing is lifted into a tidier representation and
written back out, because that is how data gets silently dropped. Typed views live above, in
pdfcraft-model.
API
let doc = Document::open(bytes)?; // Arc<Vec<u8>>
let doc = Document::open_with_password(bytes, Some("owner"))?; // encrypted files
let root = doc.root(); // Option<ObjRef> — the catalog
let obj = doc.get(ObjRef { num: 12, gen: 0 }); // load (and cache): Arc<Object>
let real = doc.resolve(&obj); // follow one indirect reference
let d = doc.dict(&obj); // Option<Dict>, resolving first
let data = stream.decoded()?; // filters applied on demand
let data = doc.with_direct_parms(&stream).decoded()?; // /DecodeParms given by reference too
let px = doc.decoded_image(&stream)?; // an image's samples, a CCITT fax image's too
let fax = doc.fax_params(&stream); // a CCITT fax image's /DecodeParms, Table 11 defaults
doc.set(r, Object::Dict(d)); // edit: lands in the overlay
let r = doc.add(obj); // append a new object
doc.free(r);
let bytes = write_incremental(&doc, &SaveOptions::default())?; // append a revision
let bytes = write_full(&doc, &SaveOptions::default())?; // garbage-collected rewrite
Both writers return the bytes; the caller decides where they go, which is what lets the engine produce a working file in memory after every edit and keep saving atomic.
Useful alongside: doc.repair_log() (what was reconstructed), doc.revisions() and
doc.revision_ends() (the incremental history), doc.is_edited(num) and doc.modified_objects(),
doc.permissions() and doc.security(), doc.set_encryption() / doc.remove_encryption(), and
doc.require_full_save() for edits that cannot be expressed incrementally.
Document is cheap to clone: the original bytes, the xref index and the parse caches are
shared, so a clone is a snapshot. Undo/redo and background jobs hold clones while the UI edits
another. Edits never touch the original bytes.
Reading
- Every cross-reference form: classic tables with their quirky subsections, cross-reference
streams, hybrid-reference files (
/XRefStm), and object streams. - Repair. A file whose xref is wrong or missing is reconstructed by scanning for
objheaders. Repairs are recorded, never silent, so the UI can say the file was damaged. - Tolerant, never fatal. The lexer works on a byte slice and a position; it allocates nothing
for skipped data, bounds-checks every index, and caps nesting depth. Malformed input yields
CosError, never a panic — this crate is the first thing a hostile file meets. Exhausted xref entries are skipped with a repair log; exhausted /Size hints allocate unused numbers without overflowing or replacing existing objects. - Lazy. Objects are parsed on first use and cached. (Whole-file buffering is still the case;
ByteSourcestreaming iscore.lazy-loading, not yet done.) - Encryption is handled on load and save through
pdfcraft-crypt: every standard-security revision R2–R6 (RC4, AES-128/256), crypt filters,/EFFembedded-file encryption, and/EncryptMetadata.security.rsknows what the spec exempts — the/Encryptdictionary, xref streams, the trailer/ID, and objects inside an object stream (the stream is encrypted whole).
Writing
write_incremental appends only the edited objects, a cross-reference section in the same
style as the file's last one, and a trailer with /Prev. The original bytes are never modified,
which is what keeps a signature over an earlier revision valid.
write_full writes only what the trailer can reach, renumbered densely — the Save As and
garbage-collecting path. By default (SaveOptions::object_streams) it packs non-stream objects
into compressed object streams with a cross-reference stream (PDF 1.5+); turning that off writes a
classic table any reader accepts.
Dictionaries keep their key order and streams keep their encoded bytes, so rewritten objects stay recognisable in a diff and byte-stable when re-serialized.
Errors
CosError: NotPdf, Syntax { offset, detail }, MissingObject, NotADictionary, Filter,
NeedsPassword, WrongPassword, Security, Poisoned.
Not done here
- Streaming very large files within a memory budget (
ByteSource,core.lazy-loading); files are read whole today. - Linearized output, Fast Web View (
core.linearization, M11). - Structural validation against the Arlington model (
core.arlington-validation), which will live in the reservedarlingtoncrate. - Image codecs.
pdfcraft-filterscarries the non-image filters and CCITT fax and JBIG2 decoding (Document::decoded_image, a JBIG2 image's/JBIG2GlobalswithinMAX_JBIG2_GLOBALS, 32 MiB, their filters undone once a document for the images that share them, up to 64 MiB kept, while their segments are decoded for every image); DCT and JPX are still decoded through the bootstrap renderer (core.image-filters, M2.6).