A CAC puts its encryption, logon and signing certificates in the store
under the same name, so the digital ID list showed several identical
entries and only one of them makes a signature that validates. Grey out
the ones whose key usage or extended key usage doesn't allow document
signing, with the reason, the same way an ID without a usable key is
already treated.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A malformed EKU left extended_key_usage at None, which reads as "no
restriction", so an issuer-signed certificate with a broken EKU could reach a
Valid verdict; EKU being on the processed-critical list let a critical one
through as well. Like keyUsage, a present EKU now restricts the key even when
it doesn't parse: it must be a SEQUENCE whose members are all OIDs, otherwise
it allows no purpose.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RUNQSPVXx3dDBabRZHAnjz
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* i18n: let the layers below hand their sentences over, so they can be translated
The accessibility findings, the PDF/A problems, the signature details, the
page-range mistakes and the edit labels were English in all ten languages,
because matching their wording from the UI with a tl! literal would break
silently whenever the engine changed it.
So each layer now hands the wording over instead, apart from the document's
own words: a WORDINGS list of every sentence it can say, with holes in it, and
said(&words), which looks the wording up through the closure it is given and
fills the holes in a single pass. in_english changes nothing, for the CLI and
the tests; the UI passes &i18n::words, a catalog lookup. A wording with no
entry comes back as it stands, which is the English, so the nine catalogs this
does not touch read exactly as before.
a11y::report_html takes a language tag and a words closure, so a saved report
reads the way the panel read, down to its lang attribute. print::PrintError
gained a variant per thing a person can be wrong about, with the numbers apart
from the words; faults rather than mistakes keep their own text.
Spanish translates all of it (107 entries). spanish_covers_what_the_engine_says
requires an entry per wording in the eight lists and
spanish_keeps_the_holes_in_what_the_engine_says requires the holes to survive
the translation, so the catalog cannot fall behind the engine unnoticed.
No new tl! literal, so the Chinese, French and Russian UI-literal gates are
unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Sign tests from #1099: compare against the &'static str kinds
* Camera tests: undo returns a Label now
---------
Co-authored-by: Fernando Areán <soporte@codebit.es>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Brandon Thomas <echelon@gmail.com>
* Parity: merge the duplicate form.field-list evidence and notes
#649 and #650 each added `evidence` and `notes` to the same entry, so the
TOML has duplicate keys and `cargo xtask parity` fails on main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* M9: the signer's certificate must allow document signing (key usage, EKU, critical extensions)
A trusted signer whose certificate may not sign documents was reported
Valid. Validation now checks the signer certificate (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.3,
§4.2.1.12, §4.2): a keyUsage needs digitalSignature or nonRepudiation, an
extended key usage needs a document-signing purpose (any, emailProtection,
codeSigning, RFC 9336 documentSigning, Adobe Authentic Documents, Microsoft
document signing), and no critical extension may be one PdfCraft doesn't
process. Otherwise the verdict is Unknown and the details say why.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* M9: a critical qcStatements extension doesn't make a qualified certificate unusable
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Brandon Thomas <echelon@gmail.com>
* M9: chain building checks CA constraints, key usage, path length and validity
build_chain linked certificates by name and signature only. An issuer must
also be allowed to issue: basicConstraints CA:TRUE (an old v1 self-signed
root without constraints still anchors), keyCertSign when there is a key
usage, a pathLenConstraint that allows the CAs below it, and validity at the
signing time (or the trusted timestamp / token time) when it is known.
Without this, an ordinary end-entity certificate of a trusted CA, embedded in
a PDF, could "issue" a certificate for any identity and chain to the trusted
root. The signature details now say why an issuer was refused.
Tests issue certificates in-process and cover each refusal, plus a signed PDF
whose signer chains through an end-entity certificate (Unknown, not Valid).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LXAstazhuAFyakty2m93Af
* M9: unreadable keyUsage, pathLen or basicConstraints fail closed; only v1/v2 self-signed certificates count as old roots
- a present keyUsage that doesn't parse allows no usage (it was unrestricted)
- a present pathLenConstraint that doesn't parse allows no CA below (it was unlimited)
- basicConstraints counts as present before it is parsed, so a garbled one can't make a
certificate look like an old root
- the self-signed-without-basicConstraints exception applies to v1/v2 certificates only
- restores the load_certificates doc comment
Tests build v1 certificates when they have no extensions, as real old roots are.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* M9: clippy: slice from a reference in the chain test
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Brandon Thomas <echelon@gmail.com>
