A hostile file could abort any process that opens it: a cell formula of a
million `%` (`1%%%…`) or a 200,000-term sum parsed into trees deep enough to
overflow the stack when printed, saved, evaluated or dropped, even in release
builds. Postfix operators (`%`, invoking a result) built their nesting in a
loop that the 256-level limit did not see.
- `parse` refuses formula text longer than Excel's 8,192 characters
(`MAX_FORMULA_LEN`, counted in characters, the leading `=` excluded). This
also bounds the depth of the left-deep trees long operator chains build.
- Each postfix `%` and each call of a result counts towards the nesting limit.
- A file's formula that is refused keeps its text and cached value, as other
unparsable formulas do.
Regression tests: formula (small-stack thread: long `%`, invoke and operator
chains are errors; the limit counts characters, not bytes) and xlsx
(`hostile_formula_text_does_not_overflow_the_stack`: open, save and drop a
workbook with such formulas and a defined name on a 1 MiB stack). Both abort
with a stack overflow without the fix.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
