Fixes from the security review of the public server:
- team libraries only in key-published files on open servers; unpacking
bounded by the file cap (zip bombs refused)
- byte-bounded send queues per connection and in all, a bound on bytes
waiting for the hub, per-address and global download budgets
- batches checked against the file, per-address and total caps as files
grow (refused with a Reject the app rolls back); the core's recent-batch
memory bounded in bytes; nothing confirmed when a log can't be written
- usage reports kept in memory; per-kind message caps checked while read
- layered IPv6 limits (/64, /56, /48), a global publish rate, connections
reserved for sessions, short idle timeout for one-shot requests
- revoked links and removed files cut library connections
- data directory 0700, server key 0600 from creation
- install.sh: SSH ports from sshd, ufw left off when other services
listen, unprivileged builds of the latest tag, settings checked before
use, own Caddy snippet; systemd memory and network caps; backups check
free space and say they hold the key
- linger reads raw bytes after an oversized frame (tungstenite asserted)
A file's library can be published to figcraft-server and enabled in other files by a share link (view access is enough); placing, styles, variables and library updates with overrides kept work as for local libraries, with a background check while the Assets panel is open. library.swap re-points instances, styles and variables to another library by name (one undo step, unmatched items listed). The server keeps per-file usage reports (library.usage).
bflatastic