Unrelated to the security changes in this branch; `main` already failed
`clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` without them. Eight
clippy::nonminimal_bool sites across seven files, each taking clippy's own
suggested rewrite.
Every rewrite is pure boolean algebra with the negation kept outside, so the
float comparisons and their NaN behaviour are untouched: !A && !B becomes
!(A || B), and !opt.is_some_and(f) becomes opt.is_none_or(!f). Two sites needed
explicit parentheses the suggestion omitted, where the rewritten term is the left
operand of an && and || binds looser.
designcraft cleared the same lint in bc840130; this is figcraft's equivalent.
Second security review:
- a broadcast counts once against the queued-bytes budget; each block of
addresses gets at most an eighth; when the budget runs out the biggest
consumer is shed, not the receiver
- forced compactions at most once a minute per file
- plugin downloads check the per-address share before the global budget
and before reading
- install.sh never replaces a Caddyfile with other sites (one import line,
once; install-test.sh in packaging lint); the built binary runs only as
the server's account
- bytes being read count against per-block and global budgets, the
biggest readers dropped first
- block multipliers x2 (/56) and x4 (/48), connection caps at most a
sixteenth/eighth of all; global publish and download budgets eight times
a /48's share
- problems capped at 200; writes refused below max(1 GiB, two files) free;
the private-server file cap documented
Fixes from the security review of the public server:
- team libraries only in key-published files on open servers; unpacking
bounded by the file cap (zip bombs refused)
- byte-bounded send queues per connection and in all, a bound on bytes
waiting for the hub, per-address and global download budgets
- batches checked against the file, per-address and total caps as files
grow (refused with a Reject the app rolls back); the core's recent-batch
memory bounded in bytes; nothing confirmed when a log can't be written
- usage reports kept in memory; per-kind message caps checked while read
- layered IPv6 limits (/64, /56, /48), a global publish rate, connections
reserved for sessions, short idle timeout for one-shot requests
- revoked links and removed files cut library connections
- data directory 0700, server key 0600 from creation
- install.sh: SSH ports from sshd, ufw left off when other services
listen, unprivileged builds of the latest tag, settings checked before
use, own Caddy snippet; systemd memory and network caps; backups check
free space and say they hold the key
- linger reads raw bytes after an oversized frame (tungstenite asserted)
Config-gated (open_publish): anyone publishes without the server key and
gets an owner token (128-bit, shown once, stored hashed) that manages only
that file. Per-address limits (X-Forwarded-For only from trusted_proxy,
bounded tables), global caps, idle expiry, reports, persisted blocks,
files list --sort, check, GET /healthz on the same listener, startup
warnings. The app asks the server first, publishes without a key when it
is open, shows the owner token once, the host/terms line, the expiry date
and a report button; collab.serverInfo, collab.manageFile, collab.report
and pref.publishServer for MCP/CLI. Protocol additions stay within
version 2, gated like signals.
A self-hosted plugin directory, with no third-party service: `figcraft-server` keeps plugin bundles,
the app browses, installs and updates from it, and `figcraft-cli` publishes to it.
- **Bundles** (`figcraft_plugin::bundle`): a plugin's manifest, module and up to 32 plain-named
assets in one uncompressed, length-prefixed binary form (nothing can expand beyond the bytes
sent). Its SHA-256 names it. `Bundle::decode` never allocates beyond its input and refuses
trailing bytes; `Bundle::check` parses the manifest (refusing a plugin API this build doesn't
run), requires a version of 1-4 numbers, compiles the module without running it (only the
sandbox's imports allowed) and checks asset names (no paths, no dot files, no Windows device
names, unique ignoring case). Manifests gain an optional `author`.
- **Protocol**: a new connection kind next to managing and team-library connections:
`OpenPlugins {key}` then `Plugins {list | fetch | publish | unpublish}`. Browsing needs no
credential; publishing and unpublishing need the server key (a wrong key is refused). Older
servers refuse the connection and the app says the server has no plugin directory. The protocol
version is unchanged; old clients are unaffected.
- **Server** (`apps/figcraft-server/src/directory.rs`): `<data>/plugins/index.json` plus
`<data>/plugins/<sha256>.bin`, so no publisher-chosen name reaches the file system. Every publish
is checked in full and must be a newer version; caps `max_plugins` (versions, 0 turns it off),
`max_plugin_mb` (<= 32), `max_plugins_mb`. Fetches re-hash the file before sending (a damaged
bundle is never sent) and share a download budget (~32 MiB/s) so a flood is refused, not queued.
Damaged index entries are skipped and reported, never deleted; an unreadable index lists nothing
and refuses writes until the operator fixes it. Operator moderation:
`figcraft-server plugins [list]` and `plugins remove ID [--version V]` (offline or through the
running server). Logs name ids and versions, never keys.
- **App**: Plugins > Manage plugins gets Installed / Browse tabs. Browse lists a server's plugins
(version, author as typed, size, access) with a search; nothing is fetched until Browse is
pressed. Install / Update open a confirmation listing the permissions asked for, the source and
the SHA-256; only its button downloads. The download must match the listed SHA-256 (and the one
shown), then is checked like an imported plugin before anything is written. Installed plugins
live per user under `<settings>/FigCraft/Plugins/<hash of id>/` and run in the same sandbox;
Remove deletes the folder.
- **Commands**: `plugin.directory.list {server?, query?}`, `plugin.directory.install {id, version?,
confirm, server?, sha256?}` (refused without `confirm: true`; never opens a dialog),
`plugin.directory.publish {path | plugin, server}`, `plugin.directory.unpublish {id, version?,
server}`. `ui.set {pluginsTab, pluginConfirm}` on the control channel.
- **CLI**: `figcraft-cli plugin publish FOLDER --server ws://host:port/` with the key from
`FIGCRAFT_SERVER_KEY` (or `?key=`), never printed.
- Docs: plugins.md (directories, publishing, commands, manifest), server.md (operating the
directory: access, checks, caps, moderation, backups, security), collab-protocol.md, mcp.md,
cli.md, control-protocol.md, target-app-parity area 18 and Ecosystem, ROADMAP, roadmap.md M11,
gaps.md gap 6. Plugins & widgets 55%/32% -> 60%/35%, 10-30 h -> 8-26 h.
figcraft-server hosts many files over the same hub the app uses for sessions, persists each as a checksummed snapshot plus an append-only log (synced before replies, compacted, damaged files skipped and reported) so restarts lose nothing confirmed, and gives per-file share links with edit or view access (hashed 128-bit tokens, revocable). The app can publish a file to a server and join server-hosted files; view-only tabs refuse edits. Protocol version 2.
skylar taylor-barrick